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assumptions and boundary conditions [IAEA SSG-2, 2008] . Among these options, traditional DSA using Best Estimate (BE) Thermal-Hydraulic (TH) codes based on conservative (pessimistic) assumptions on the system dynamics and physical models (i.e., IAEA option 3) is limited in the consideration of system failure modes and sequences, timing and order of failure events.
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) overcomes the limitation of considering only
DBAs by extending the set of accidents through a systematic analysis of the failure events and sequences (e.g., by Event Trees (ETs) / Fault Trees (FTs)). Yet, PSA does not
give full account to the timing of failure events and to the magnitude of component failures, which can be important especially when the system dynamics significantly influences the system failure behavior [Rutt et al., 2006] .
Dynamic reliability approaches [Siu, 1994; Devooght, 1997; Marseguerra et al., 1998; Labeau et al., 2000; Dufour et al., 2002; Di Maio et al., 2009; Aldemir, 2013] [Aldemir, 2013; and as a by-product for the quantification of operational safety margins within a dynamic reliability scheme [Zio et al., 2012] .
Traditionally, a safety margin is defined as the minimum distance between the system "loading" and its "capacity" [US D.O.E., 2009] . The challenge is the effective representation of the uncertainties inherent in the TH code parameters, correlations and approximations.
Uncertainty is typically distinguished into two types: randomness due to inherent variability in the system behavior and imprecision due to lack of knowledge and information on the system [Apostolakis, 1990] . The former type of uncertainty is often referred to as objective, aleatory, stochastic, whereas the latter is often referred to as subjective, epistemic, state of knowledge [Apostolakis 1990; Helton, 2011] . To deal with these uncertainties, traditional safety margins quantification in DSA analysis has implied conservatism in both the analysis of the TH code outputs and the evaluation criteria [Nutt et al., 2004] . Best Estimate (BE) methodologies have reduced the amount of conservatism for the evaluation of safety margins, but do not take into account all aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in the physical models stochastic behavior and model parameter values [US D.O.E., 2009] .
In order to more realistically quantify the uncertainty of TH code outcomes, a probabilistic safety margin definition has been proposed for PSA, which better deals with epistemic uncertainties [Zio et al., 2010] . However, the effect of timing, order and magnitude of the component failures on the system dynamics is not considered.
In this respect, a Dynamic probabilistic Safety Margin (DSM) approach is proposed in this paper, based on time-dependent phenomenological models of stochastic system evolution including possible dependencies between failure events [Aldemir, 2013] . For this, we introduce a novel definition of a DSM by the combined quantification of a percentile (e.g., 95 th ) of the safety parameter distribution (e.g., oil temperature, peak cladding temperature) and a percentile (e.g., 5 th ) of the distribution of the earliest time required to the safety parameter to reach the given percentile value. The uncertainties affecting the DSM are treated using Order Statistics (OS) (i.e., Bracketing and Coverage approach) [Nutt et al., 2004] . By doing so, we are able to compute the confidence that, for a selected accidental scenario of a Dynamic Event Tree (DET) obtained by a IDPSA analysis, the estimated 95 th percentile of the safety parameter cannot be reached before the 5 th percentile of the estimated time: if these estimated percentiles meet the safety criteria with the required confidence, the NPP can be licensed as "safe" to withstand the selected accidental scenario.
The rationale behind the choice of the selection of the 95 th and the 5 th percentiles for the safety parameter and the estimated time, respectively, lies in the attempt of assuring that there is no significant evidence of exceedance of the safety parameter threshold which could lead to a higher than accepted probability of failure within an extremely unavoidable (fast) time (i.e., the unlikely condition that the safety parameter reaches the threshold within the 5 th percentile value of the time distribution). With these assumptions, the proposed definition of DSM provides the analyst with the additional resilience information on the available time for counteracting the occurrence of an accidental scenario, rather than only quantifying to which extent the selected combination of failure events can be harmful for the NPP.
The proposed framework of analysis is developed with reference to a Lead Bismuth Eutectic-eXperimental Accelerator Driven System (LBE-XADS) model, in which the average oil temperature ( , ), of the secondary coolant loop is taken as the safety parameter [Cammi et al., 2006; Di Maio et al., 2009] . A SIMULINK model of the LBE-XADS system is used for the estimation of the percentiles of the maximum oil temperature ( , ) distribution and of the distribution of the time required to reach , . A Monte Carlo (MC)-driven fault injection engine is used for randomly sampling the model parameters values, the components failures times and magnitudes. The illustration of the analysis is given with respect to one accidental scenario of a DET generated in an IDPSA.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the concept of probabilistic safety margin is explored and that of DSM is introduced. In Section 3, a brief explanation is given of the OS approaches (bracketing and coverage) used for the definition of the number of TH code runs for uncertainty analysis with a required confidence (e.g., 95%) in the quantification of the DSM. In Section 4, a short description of the LBE-XADS system and its failure modes is given, along with the SIMULINK model used. The MC driven fault injection engine, used for sampling the physical parameters affecting the system behavior (epistemic uncertainties) and the components failure times and magnitudes (aleatory uncertainties), is also presented, the effects of the uncertainties on the dynamic evolution of , are discussed, and the results are shown and analyzed. Conclusions of the whole study are drawn in Section 5.
DYNAMIC PROBABILISTIC SAFETY MARGIN
Traditionally, for an accidental scenario ' ', the safety margin ( , ) is defined as the difference between the conservatively computed values reached by a selected safety parameter ( ), j=1,2,…J, and a predefined upper (lower) threshold ( ) during an accidental scenario [Nutt et al., 2004; Secchi et al., 2008; Martorell et al., 2009] .
For the upper threshold , it is defined as:
and for the lower threshold as:
where is a reference value for ( ), which can also be considered as the nominal value of the safety parameter . However, a safety margin so defined ends up to be too conservatively computed not accounting explicitly for the uncertainties in the estimation of safety margin [Martorell et al., 2006; Zio et al., 2008 b ] .
To overcome this conservatism, the safety margin can be defined in probabilistic terms as the difference between ( ) and the value of a specific 1 percentile of the distribution of the safety parameter ( ), accounting for both the aleatory and epistemic uncertainties that effect . Without loss of generality, we only refer to an upper threshold , the extension to being straightforward. By regulation, 1 is usually set equal to the 95 th percentile. Despite that, the estimation of the probability density function of y, ( ), and of its -th percentile 1 , ( 1 ), is a non-trivial task that requires guaranteeing a confidence 1 (e.g., 95% confidence), viz [Nutt et al., 2004; Zio et al., 2010] : The definition of probabilistic safety margin of equation (5) can be enriched by taking into account the resilience information related to the time required for reaching 1 .
Similarly to , if we consider the pdf ( ) of time required to reach 1 , 2 a specific percentile (e.g., 5 th percentile) of and ̂2 its estimate, then we can define (see Figure 2 ):
The dynamic probabilistic safety margin can, thus, be defined as a probabilistic safety margin with respect to the safety parameter together with the information on the earliest (grace) time required to reach that margin (i.e., the available time for counteracting the occurrence of an accidental scenario a).
( 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 ) =
with grace time ̂2 (8) where, the 2 -th percentile of the grace time, ̂2, provides the twofold information regarding: the resilience of the system not to exceed the safety threshold and the available time for undertaking counteraction measures. In other words, it provides the dynamic information for the computed probabilistic safety margin.
ORDER STATISTICS FOR PERCENTILES ESTIMATION
Order statistics (OS) is a non-parametric statistical quantification approach that has been shown useful in for various nuclear applications: evaluation of fuel densification [U.S. NRC, 1978] , evaluation of the reliability of an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) [U.S. NRC, 1996] and a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) best estimate plus uncertainty nuclear safety analysis [Martin et al., 2011] . The invaluable advantage of OS is that an unlimited number of model uncertainties can be explicitly considered simultaneously, especially when the Nutt-Wallis method [Nutt et al., 2004] is enforced (as done in this work) for capturing the uncertainties in multivariate cases: this is, indeed, the only approach for multivariate cases that can determine their individual coverage with a specified confidence level and an expression of the probability distribution is not required [Martin et al., 2011] .
In this study, the estimates ̂1 and ̂2 are quantified using OS [Nutt et al., 2004] methodology to get the optimal number of samples of the TH code simulations to be run to guarantee confidences 1 and 2 in the estimation of ̂1 and ̂2, respectively. This is done to avoid the computational costs for running complex TH models for obtaining the full distributions of and . Nutt et al., 2004] . Order
Statistics and Finite Mixture Models (FMMs) [Carlos et al., 2013; Di Maio et al., 2014 b ] are used for the quantification of the uncertainties of the outputs. FMM provides a natural "clustering" of the TH code outputs, by reproducing them providing information pertaining to the most important input variables which affect the output uncertainty, whereas OS focuses on characterizing the PDFs of certain percentiles and providing approximate estimation of safety limits. This latter can also be integrated with Artificial Neural Network (ANNs) for speeding up the computation by substituting the TH code with a simpler and faster surrogate [Di Maio et al., 2015; Zio et al., 2008 b ; Mclachlan et al., 2000] . Therefore, OS allows obtaining the optimum number of samples to be used for properly estimating the percentiles ̂1 and ̂2 with high confidences 1 and 2 , respectively.
Let us assume we have a collection of two output vectors ̅ = { 1 , 2 , … … , } and ̅ = { 1 , 2 , … … . , } that are obtained from N runs of the TH code, each one with a [Nutt et al., 2004; Wald, 1943; Zio et al.,2008 a,b ]. It is worth noticing that the m th member , of the sorted outputs is required to guarantee a confidence ( 2 ) of not exceeding (i.e., being smaller than) the unknown true 2 ℎ percentile 2 .
Two non-parametric approaches (namely Bracketing and Coverage) can be embraced to calculate and to deal with a multi-dimensional output ̅ and ̅ and their uncertainties.
Both approaches entail two sets of outputs to be sequentially sorted. Then, from the regulatory bodies point of view, the two approaches fundamentally differ in the way they demand the outputs to satisfy their specific safety criteria. The Bracketing approach only guarantees a certain fraction of the possible nuclear safety codes outputs to be simultaneously considered, which does not guarantee adherence to all safety criteria simultaneously, but they are guaranteed to be satisfied by each output independently (or by a subset of outputs) [Nutt et al., 2004] . Coverage, on the other hand, provides a confidence that all outputs will simultaneously meet the criteria and, thus, it is expected to better conform to the regulatory conservative guidelines [Nutt et al., 2004] .
Bracketing
The Bracketing approach provides the confidence that each value of the outputs from the sorted lists will be covered by the specified ranges of the cumulative probability distribution of all possible results of that output [Nutt et al., 2004] . Let 1 be the probability that lies below 1 in any of the runs, whatever the value of ; 2 is the corresponding probability for the other output . The and sets of outputs are assumed to be uncorrelated for the purpose of simplification. For uncorrelated outputs and assuming = 1, we can calculate from equation (9), where is expressed as a function of and [Nutt et al., 2004 ]:
A value = 72 allows calculating the = 95 th percentile of ̅ (i.e., ̂1) with a = 95% confidence; similarly, ̂2 can be found by sorting = 72 values of ̅ [Nutt et al., 2004] .
Coverage
The Coverage approach provides the confidence that each value of the sorted outputs will be covered by the specific ranges of the joint probability distribution of the outputs [Wilks, 1941; Wald, 1943; Nutt et al., 2004] . The coverage approach requires knowledge on the correlation between the outputs and . It is assumed after investigation that the sets of outputs and are found to be uncorrelated. Shortly, for uncorrelated outputs and = 1, we calculate = 89 resorting to equation (10) [Nutt et al., 2004 ]:
where = 0.95 and = 0.95. This value confirms that the Coverage approach requires larger number of runs as compared to the Bracketing approach. This is because in the Coverage approach (contrarily to the Bracketing approach) one output (e.g., ) is sorted jointly with the other output (e.g., ) and both percentiles 1 and 2 are required to simultaneously lie within the estimated percentiles ̂1 and ̂2 to guarantee the confidence 1 and 2 .
THE LBE-XADS SYSTEM
The Lead-Bismuth Eutectic eXperimental Accelerator Driven System (LBE-XADS) is a sub-critical, fast reactor in which the fission process for providing thermal power ( ) is sustained by an external neutron source through spallation reaction by a proton beam ( ) accelerated by a synchrotron on a lead-bismuth eutectic target: a simple scheme of the system is given in Figure 3 [Cammi et al., 2006] .
The primary cooling system is of pool-type with Lead-Bismuth Eutectic (LBE) liquid metal coolant leaving the top of the core, at full power nominal conditions, at temperature , equal to 400 [°C] pushed by natural circulation enhanced by argon gas injection into the heat exchangers of the secondary cooling circuit and then re-entering the core from the bottom through the down-comer at temperature , equal to 300 [°C] . The average in-core temperature of the LBE , is taken as the mean of , and , [Di Maio et al., 2009] . The secondary cooling system is a flow of diathermic oil at 290-320 [°C], at full power conditions. Cooling of the diathermic oil is obtained through an airflow Γ ( ) provided by three air coolers connected in series [Di Maio et al., 2009] . As described in [Cammi et al., 2006] 
The Monte-Carlo Driven Fault Injection Engine
In order to simulate transients representative of the dynamic failure behavior of the LBE-XADS, the SIMULINK model has been embedded within a MC procedure for sampling the values of the input physical variables from their respective uncertainty distributions (epistemic uncertainty) and injecting faults at random times and of random magnitudes (aleatory uncertainty).
Epistemic Uncertainty
The physical input parameters that are fed to the SIMULINK model have been randomly sampled from their respective distributions as given in The result of the random sampling of the physical parameters fed to the SIMULINK model of the LBE-XADS is given in Figure 6 where a large set of transients are plotted whose evolution is affected by the sampled values of input parameters. The randomness of the evolution of the oil average temperature ( ) in comparison with its nominal case (shown in Figure 5 ) is due to the inherent variability and combination of the sampled physical variables. Nevertheless, the inherent uncertainties of the physical variables do  The communication between air coolers actuators and PID controller fails so that the PID is provided with the same input value of the previous time step.
The choice of a mission time of 3000 [s] has been made, because it is a long enough interval of time to allow the complete development also of slow dynamic accident scenarios occurring at early/medium times [Di Maio et al., 2009] . Within the mission time of 3000 s, the transients can lead to three end states:
A comprehensive quantitative reliability assessment of the system is expected to involve all system components and failure modes and the dynamic effects arising from the complex interactions of all system elements, including the software and the human (here not modeled) [Di Maio et al., 2009] . However, to reduce the computational burden and to avoid the complexity of combinatorial explosion of a DET in such situation [Di Maio, 2009 ], we consider the ad-hoc case study hereafter described and sketched in Figure 8 .
As an example of a dynamic evolution of an accidental scenario among the infinite number of scenarios that might be considered in a DET for IDPSA, we limit our analysis to those scenarios leading to high-temperature failure mode (the upper safety threshold is equal to = ℎ, = 613.15 [K] ) and, among these, to the scenarios that consist in multiple successive failures of the air coolers getting stuck at random times and magnitudes (whose distributions are given in Table 2 ). The set of failure events that occur during this accidental scenario are not Prime Implicants (PIs) (i.e., these are not the minimum combination of failure events, with certain order and timing, that could lead the system to failure) [Di Maio et al., 2015; Garret et al., 1999] ). Thus, this set of failure events does not unequivocally determine the end-state of the system as a failure, but, rather, it is a 'near-miss' scenario [Di Maio et al., 2009] . These failure events make the temperature , approach the upper safety threshold ℎ, without exceeding it, as shown in Figure 9 , where the evolution of 104 safe transients of , towards ℎ, are plotted, when the selected accidental scenario of Table 2 (and sketched in bold line in Figure 8 ) is injected into the SIMULINK model of the LBE-XADS along with the uncertainties of its physical variables (as given in Table   1 ). It is worth pointing out that the random timings and magnitudes of successive failures cause randomness in the system dynamics (as shown in Table 3 , where, the maximum temperature reached , and the time at which this is reached are listed for each transient that is plotted in Figure 9 ). The need of assessing the risk related to the occurrence of this scenario, in terms of both the capability of the system to keep below ℎ, and the availability of time for counteracting the temperature rise, calls for the quantification of a DSM.
To do this, we aim at estimating, with a given confidence , the 95 th percentiles of the distribution of , and the 5 th percentile of the distribution of the time required to reach these temperatures. , during the accidental scenario described in Table 2 Table 3 List of the maximum value of the average oil temperature that is reached in the simulations of Figure 9 and the respective times.
Results and Discussions
For applying the Bracketing and Coverage approaches to = , and , = 72 and = 89 samples are randomly selected from the 104 safe transients plotted in Figure 9 and listed in Table 3 . In both cases, has been chosen to be equal to 1, 1 equal to 0.95, 2 equal to 0.05 and 1 and 2 equal to 95%. In practice, we want to quantify the dynamic probabilistic safety margin for the selected accidental scenario by quantifying a reasonable grace time ̂2 before the estimated temperature ̂1 is reached. Indeed, the value of 2 = 5 th percentile with 2 = 95% will allow the operator to know the time at his disposal with large confidence for mitigating the risk of the onset of the selected accidental scenario.
Results using Bracketing approach
Using the = 72 samples, the results of the point estimates of the 95 th percentile (γ1) of Maximum Oil Temperature and the 5 th percentile (γ2) of the time taken to reach the maximum temperature, as computed by the Bracketing OS method on the sample ̅ = { 1 , 2 , … … , } and ̅ = { 1 , 2 , … … . , } are given in Table 4 . The two sets of outputs ̅ and ̅ are independently sorted in descending and ascending order, respectively. The −th value of the sorted ̅ of the = 72 , values sampled from Table 3 is assumed (according to OS theory) to exceed the real 95 th percentile of ̅ with a probability of 95%. Similarly for ̅ , the −th value is considered to be that time which with probability 95% underestimate the 5 th percentile of ̅ . The DSM for the safety parameter y is calculated using equation (8) 
Results using Coverage approach
The same analysis is done using the Coverage approach on = 89 selected samples. The outcomes of the point estimates of the 95 th percentile ( 1 ) of , and the 5 th percentile ( 2 ) of the time taken to reach the maximum temperature, as computed by the Coverage OS method on the sample ̅ = { 1 , 2 , … … , } and ̅ = { 1 , 2 , … … . , }, are given in Table 5 . The two sets of outputs ̅ and ̅ are jointly sorted in descending order for the ̅ set of values and its corresponding time from the ̅ set as given in Table 3 . The −th value of the sorted ̅ of the =89 , values samples from Table 3 is assumed (according to OS theory) to exceed the real 95 th percentile of ̅ with a probability of 95% while also, simultaneously for ̅ , the −th value of the sorted ̅ is considered to be that time which with a probability of 95% underestimates the 5 th percentile of ̅ .
The DSM for the safety parameter y is again calculated using equation (8) It is to be observed that the point estimates of the 95 th percentile and the 5 th percentile (as shown in Table 4 and Table 5 , respectively) guarantee the dynamic probabilistic safety margin to be positive in both cases of Bracketing and Coverage, and provide additional integrated information about the grace time before , is reached.
As a concluding remark, it is worth noticing that both the dynamic probabilistic safety margins of Tables 4 and 5 result to be equal to 0.0044 with Bracketing and Coverage approaches, respectively. This is not surprising, because these results have been obtained with a different number of simulations. The Coverage approach is more computationally burdensome ( =89 samples required) as compared to the Bracketing approach ( =72 samples required). This is because the Bracketing approach provides a safety margin when both outputs ( , and ) are tested to independently meet the safety criteria, while the Coverage approach guarantees for both outputs to simultaneously fall into the acceptable criteria.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we address the problem of the estimation of dynamic probabilistic safety margin for taking into account the aleatory and epistemic uncertainties affecting the physical behavior of dynamic systems. We adopt by using Order Statistics and Finite
Mixture Models approaches to jointly estimate percentiles of the distributions of the safety parameter and of the time required for the safety parameter to reach these percentiles values. This information, here originally provided within the framework of safety margin, is quite important in practice.
The computational framework has been developed with respect to an accidental sequence considered in an IDPSA that might occur in the LBE-XADS system. The result of the OS approaches of Bracketing and Coverage for the LBE-XADS case study confirms the capability of the proposed framework for the quantification of the safety margin and the estimation of the grace time with a given confidence. Using an optimal number of samples as proposed by the OS theory, the point estimates of the percentiles of the distributions of a safety parameter and of the earliest time required for the safety parameter to reach this percentile can be computed for estimating the dynamic probabilistic safety margins with a given confidence.
